NSO, Yuli Novak

My younger son and his fiancée came over from TA and I brought D’s mom over from her retirement home. We kept her away from my daughter and her kids because they were exposed to someone who has been sick with the Omicron, lately. The weather started to clear up, though it remains cold.

NSO

There was an item in the TV news about NSO; an interview with one of the founders, and the CEO, Shalev Hulio. He doesn’t cut a very impressive figure and seemed nervous and evasive when asked key questions. A family man, maybe a little naive or unused to journalists. The TV news channel spent 2 days in the NSO headquarters in Herzlia and interviewed a few others there too. One guy demonstrated how what the company does is not simple interception of phones; it helps the clients to interpret the information collected and to construct an elaborate porfolio of the target and their network of connections. Sounds familiar from the descriptions of intelligence firm operations found in Cory Doctorow’s novel, “Attack Surface”.

The NYT story on NSO that I read yesterday had lots of new information. If it can be relied upon, it shows, in a more detailed way than known previously, how the sale of Pegasus went hand in hand with Israeli diplomacy and created friends among client countries who voted for Israel and against Palestinian interests in discussions at the UN. It also clearly states that India and Djibouti among others purchased Pegasus, despite denials or refusals to comment.

In the news item, Hulio is given the opportunity to make the case for the need for cyberweapons when facing sophisticated criminal or terrorist organizations. This is overshadowed by the fact that most of the countries to which the system was sold ended up using it against political opponents, critical journalists, ordinary citizens or diplomats of other countries. In this way, cyberweapons are not like other weapons. They are ideally constructed to undermine democracy wherever they land; even in supposedly democratic countries.

Yuli Novak

Haaretz runs stories in its English edition that have often appeared a few days earlier in its Hebrew edition. So today they have the story about Yuli Novak, a previous director of the Breaking the Silence organization. When the NGO and its members began to be hounded by rightwing groups, the media and politicians, and the group’s members began to receive death threats, she stepped down and away from Breaking the Silence and fled overseas for a time. Now she is reassessing her relationship with her country and with Zionism.

Breaking the Silence is an organization that publishes testimony of former soldiers as a means to help Israeli society reevaluate the meaning of its military occupation of Palestinian territories. It is not the radical political organization that it is made out to be in the Israeli media. It actually stays clear of direct criticism of Israel. It simply tries to show people the consequences of what the army is doing in the Occupied Territories; to “break the silence” about what is being done by the military. Like Edward Snowden and other whistleblowers, it spreads awareness of activities that are normally kept out of sight and removed from the consciousness of ordinary citizens.

As such, it does not need to take a political stance and it is actually better for its work if it stays out of politics. The organization is made up of former soldiers who, when they signed up, believed in the army’s mission, but got freaked out by what they saw happening on the ground. Whatever political conclusions they came to as a result are personal, and do not necessarily represent the organization itself. The point is to gather the soldiers’ testimony and to present it as part of a public education campaign, so that citizens can form their own opinions. At least that is what I understood after going on a tour of Hebron with one of the organization’s founders and listening to him at other times.

Choosing to target Breaking the Silence, and other organizations that are within the fold of the Zionist left, such as Betselem and the New Israel Fund, seems to have been a conscious choice of the Right. They obviously see them as more of a threat than truly anti-Zionist groups, whose numbers and resources are even more scant.

Yuli Novak – feminist, LGBT person and leftist as she is – seems to have taken quite a long time to question the narratives she grew up with and only recently has been coming around to opinions that many Israelis reached long ago. But eventually it dawned upon her:

“What sort of coexistence are you proposing here?” she asks rhetorically during our conversation, aiming the question at the Zionist left. “A coexistence that favors only you? That simply will not work. The moment we recognize that we are not living in a democracy in the deepest and most basic way, it suddenly becomes a lot easier to understand what is going on here. And it’s no longer chaotic.”

I guess by “chaotic” she means the dissonance between her received understanding of reality based on what she has been told, and what she actually sees. I’m not sure that she’s entirely out of it herself, just like all of us. A certain part of us always wants to believe that we are living in a fine sort of country that will basically be OK if we can only fix a few things. But that’s not true in any of the liberal (and increasingly less liberal) democracies. It certainly isn’t true of a society that is based on myths about selective group identity.

Nations, if we need them at all, should exist for the welfare of the totality of their citizens, not just for their elites, for particular ethnicities, castes, religious or ideological communities. They should provide us with a comfortable framework in which to live and maintain a peaceful relationship with other nations and the biosphere. The details may be difficult to work out but at least the mission statement should be clear.

Moxie & Ceglowski

I found this Twitter interchange regarding Telegram, between Moxie Marlinspike and Maciej Ceglowski, interesting. It is from December 2021. I had somehow seen the Moxie tweets earlier, but hadn’t seen Ceglowski’s, who brought the practical example of Telegram’s use during the Hong Kong protests.

Marlinspike is the man behind the Signal messenger. Ceglowski is the man behind the social bookmarking service Pinboard.in and an interesting writer on society, politics and the internet.

I have pulled their tweets out of Twitter and connected them.

Moxie Marlinspike:

It’s amazing to me that after all this time, almost all media coverage of Telegram still refers to it as an “encrypted messenger.”

Telegram has a lot of compelling features, but in terms of privacy and data collection, there is no worse choice. Here’s how it actually works:

Telegram stores all your contacts, groups, media, and every message you’ve ever sent or received in plaintext on their servers. The app on your phone is just a “view” onto their servers, where the data actually lives.

Almost everything you see in the app, Telegram also sees

Here’s a simple test: delete Telegram, install it on a brand new phone, and register with your number. You will immediately see all your conversation history, all of your contacts, all the media you’ve shared, all of your groups. How? It was all on their servers, in plaintext.

The confusion is that Telegram does allow you to create very limited “secret chats” (no groups, synchronous, no sync) that nominally do use e2ee, even if the security of the e2ee protocol they use is dubious.

There’s no e2ee by default, but they talk about it like there is

FB Messenger also has an e2ee “secret chat” mode that is actually much less limited than Telegram’s (and also uses a better e2ee protocol), but nobody would consider Messenger to be an “encrypted messenger.”

FB Messenger and Telegram are built almost exactly the same way.

Some may feel okay letting Telegram have access to all of their data, msgs, images, contacts, groups, etc. because they “trust Telegram.”

However, the point of an “encrypted messenger” should be that you don’t have to trust anyone other than the ppl you’re communicating with.

Actual privacy tech is not about trusting someone else w/ your data. It’s about not having to. A msg you send should only be visible to you & recipient. A group’s details should only be vis to the other members. Looking up your contacts should not reveal them to anyone else.

Privacy tech is really about making the tech consistent with the UI. But if Telegram’s UI were consistent with the way the tech worked, every chat would be a group chat with everyone that works at Telegram + everyone that hacks Telegram + every gov that accesses Telegram, etc

For the folks writing about this space, my request is that when you write “encrypted messenger,” it should at minimum mean an app where all messages are e2ee by default. Telegram and FB Messenger are built exactly the same way. Neither are “encrypted messengers.”

Maciej Ceglowski

There’s a disconnect between critiques of Telegram and its practical use that have made me uneasy about joining technical pile-ons around how it’s not really encrypted messaging. Let me use the example of Telegram use in the Hong Kong protests.

1/I arrived in Hong Kong with each hair standing individually on end because everyone was using Telegram, which of course stores every group chat server-side like Moxie says. It took me a while to understand why it was so popular despite this shortcoming.

One reason was the ability to have three scales of chat in one app—really enormous (tens of thousands) of groups where you didn’t have to share your identity, regular group chat, and one-on-one chats with people.

The one-on-one chats were popular because they could be set to an ephemeral mode, so that if a cop caught you and made you unlock your phone, you wouldn’t get them in trouble. The huge supergroups were useful for organizing protest events and broadcasting information.

People were trying to avoid getting recognized in the moment, caught in the moment, or having to broadcast their identity to a huge group of strangers (HELLO I AM INTERESTED IN ATTENDING YOUR PROTEST), although this later turned out to be a huge hole in Telegram and caused a fuss

So the tradeoff was a mix of the app being usable and useful, safety in numbers, basic anonymity features in large groups, the ability to have massive supergroups, and disappearing chat. Compare this to Signal, where you saw everyone’s phone number and it was buggy as hell

If the Chinese government wanted to come after you individually, you were screwed no matter what app you used. People brought phones to protests and that cell tower data was stored somewhere much easier for the PRC to obtain than even hacking Telegram.

The whole thing left me feeling far more confused about the role of E2E than I had been going in. Even today, if a state actor is seriously interested in you specifically, it’s game over. Signal can keep your messages triple secret all it wants, but it doesn’t really matter.

Either your device will be compromised, or the person you are having the triple-secret conversation is a government agent to begin with and even wearing a secret decoder ring on each finger is going to help.

So I think the right way to think of Telegram is an “encrypted enough” messenger, and for E2E purists to take a more careful look at why it is so widely used in protests movements, and why people find using “real” encrypted apps like Signal such a pain in the ass

The broader problem of ephemeral or spur of the moment protest activity leaving a permanent data trail that can be forensically analyzed and target individuals many years after the fact is unsolved and poses a serious risk to dissent. But E2E is not the solution to it.

I feel like Moxie and a lot of end-to-end encryption purists fall into the same intellectual tarpit as the cryptocurrency people, which is that it should be possible to design technical systems that require zero trust, and that the benefits of these designs are self-evident

But a truly trustless system is inhuman, and you’re going to get monstrous results if you try to impose it on human behavior. Homo encrypticus doesn’t exist any more than homo economicus. We need to think more deeply about how to make these technologies serve people as they are

The most dangerous thing about social software systems today is that they impose consequences on everyday actions that are unbounded in severity and time. You can be fired today for a social media comment you made as a kid, you can have $100M stolen by plugging in a USB device.

Reducing the blast radius of normal human mistakes, dismantling the permanent record part of the surveillance economy, and not forcing people to make irrevocable lifetime decisions every time they use a phone are the only way out of this mess. That’s not solvable with software.

Moxie (response):

Hey what do I know, maybe sending all of our plaintext data to a Russian oligarch & his associates to indelibly manage is the solution to online privacy.

I’m just saying that we shouldn’t call it an “encrypted messenger,” because it simply isn’t – any more than FB Messenger is.

Social media links for US visa applicants

Trump administration to force US visa applicants to hand over social media details
(Was optional the last couple of years, but will now be required.)

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-visa-application-social-media-accounts-details-esta-check-a8940381.html

Nearly all travellers to the US will be required to produce details of social media accounts they have used in the previous five years, as well as present and past phone numbers and email addresses.

After the approval of revised visa application forms, the US State Department is now requiring nearly all applicants for US immigrant and non-immigrant visas to list their Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media usernames.

The change is expected to affect some 15 million foreigners who travel to the US each year, including those who do so for business or education.

Only applicants for certain diplomatic and official visa types are exempted from the requirements.

Modem Router

I’m returning the shiny new modem-router the phone company sent me and have bought a new one over the counter instead. The phone company’s modem came with a long contract that involved agreeing to all kinds of data collection. They can probably gather this anyway, but at least I don’t have to agree to it. My sons, who, I’m sure are smarter than me about such matters, say that they are already resigned to the fact that nothing we do online or offline is private anymore. My only response is that at least we should resist, even if our resistance isn’t effective. “Like Palestinians,” I say. “And where does it get them?” they respond. I suppose freedom is a state of mind. If we make choices, even when they are inconvenient, difficult or even dangerous, we grow in spirit. When we just accept the default options, we are cowed, enslaved, though we may not realise it. The awareness of our subjugation only comes when we begin to resist a system and sometimes get pushed into compromises. But small acts of resistance restore the sense of our integrity.

Searchencrypt

There’s a search engine called searchencrypt.com that claims to be more private than DDG. I took a look. I couldn’t find an explanation of where their search results originate from, who they are, what their business model is, where their money comes from, or why they want us to install a browser extention that has access to all our data. I think it’s possible to create a default search engine without installing an addon, and the only addon I’ve installed in Waterfox is PrivacyBadger.

I see from their “about page” only that the company operates out of Limassol, Cyprus and from their “terms of service” page that the software is copyrighted. Without more information, I don’t think I will be using this one.

Update:

I’ve eventually chosen searx (about) as my default search engine for my Waterfox browser, using an instance of it hosted by Disroot.org. Steps to do this:
1. opened https://search.disroot.org/
2. clicked on the down arrow next to the search box.
3. chose the option to add SearX to the list of search engines.
4. clicked on “search preferences”, (which takes us to the right place in Preferences.’
5. clicked on searx to make that the default search engine.
I also made searx my home page.

Tor has grown easier

For the last couple of days I’ve been using Tor for general browsing again. It seems to have gotten a little easier. My work email is on Google Apps, and it was previously almost impractical to use Tor with Gmail. I think some people object that it defeats the purpose of Tor to use it for sites like Gmail, but I’m not aiming for total anonymity, just better privacy than I ordinarily have.  Now the Gmail issue has gone away, it’s no longer necessary to divide my time between it and another browser.

While updating a website today the exit node I was connecting through was blacklisted, but it was enough to change the Tor circuit in order to overcome that.

Tor has also proved to be fast enough for my needs. Something about it may eventually iritate me; but for now good.

Wanna buy my browsing history?

ISPs might do well at profiling the interests of some of their customers. But for people like web designers, writers or journalists, an average day might see them browsing an eclectic mix of sites on everything under the sun. And what if you’ve got a couple of people like that, or a bored teenager or two in the household as well? I wonder how useful this information might be to an advertiser?

So I just had a thought: rather than assiduously trying to cover our steps by using VPNs, Tor, Https Everywhere, Privacy Badger, or whatever, maybe an opposite strategy would be far superior.

A call to app or browser extension designers: give us something that can randomize browsing history. Automate sending our browser on a day-long crawl across multiple and sundry websites. The resulting web history would be pure gibberish, of no value to anyone. Furthermore, it would quickly become obvious what was happening: our browsing history would become just as worthless to the government surveillance agencies that are tracking us too.

Resisting the normalization of surveillance by demonstrating that we care

In the coming weeks the UK will pass the most stringent and far reaching surveillance law in any western nation.  In the US, millions of people are alarmed about the possible implications of electing to the highest office a demagogic xenophobe with a muddled right wing agenda. Other countries too have been tightening up their surveillance laws, using the danger of terrorism as excuse.  In response to this massive assault on our privacy, it is our duty to resist surveillance, either through political means, or by demonstrating as individuals that we care about our privacy and will do all that we can to protect it. In fact, we will deliberately make life difficult for security and law enforcement agencies to collect information on us.

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